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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

La VELL KEMP and THELMA
ALICE KEMP, his wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs
and Appellants,

Case No.
11671

vs.

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Third Party Plaintiffs, LaV ell Kemp and
Thelma Alice Kemp will be referred to hereinafter as
Appellants and the Defendant, Zions First National
Rank, will be referred to as Respondent. All italics are
added for emphasis.
1

S'I,'ATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to determine the priority of two
separate mortgage liens effecting certain parcels of real
property situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the Court sitting with a jury.
At the conclusion of trial, special interrogatories were
propounded to the jury, and the Court thereupon entered judgment on the verdict in favor of the Respondent
and against the Appellants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks affirmance
judgment.

of the Trial-Courts

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Sometime between September and the early part of
November, 1964, Dr. Joseph W. Noble contacted the
Appellants for the purpose of purchasing their interest
and title in two separate parcels of real property located in the vicinity of Draper, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah (R. 63-65). After some negotiations Appellan'ts agreed to sell the said properties, and on the 19th
day of November, 1964, executed and delivered a War·
2

nu1ty Deed, without restrictions, to the said Joseph W.
and Eilene S. Noble, his wife, as joint tenants,
rdativc to the subject property (Ex. 9-P) (R. 71 ) .
At the time said Warranty Deed was executed, Appellants knew that Grantees in said Deed were in the process of obtaining mortgage financing from the Respondent with which to obtain funds to purchase the subject
properties, and that the said Respondent contemplated
a mortgage loan upon said properties as security for
said loan (R. 175, 176, 177). On November 20, 1964,
the N ables executed and delivered a Deed of Trust in
favor of the Respondent, covering the subject properties, to secure the repayment of a loan in the amount of
$35,000.00, evidenced by a Promissory Note of even
date (Ex. 19-D, and 20-D) (R. 145, 146, 147, 148). On
November 21, 1964, the Appellants called at the office
of the Respondent, reviewed a Closing Statement (Ex.
10-D) and affixed their respective signatures to said
statement in approval thereof, and thereafter obtained
the balance of the monies reflected as due the Seller (R.
fll, 92, 164).

In late November 1964, Appellants received in the
mail a Promissory Note in the principal sum of
$29,000.00 dated November 30, 1964, and a mortgage
dated November 20, 1964, bearing the signatures of the
said Joseph W. Noble and Eilene S. Noble (Ex. 7-P
and 8-P) ( R. 66) . When Appellants received the note
and mortgage they "just put them away" (R. 67) and
failed to record the said mortgage until February 9,
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1966, more than fourteen months following the date of
receipt of said instruments.
It was not until after the Nobles had defaulted in
the mortgage indebtedness in favor of the Respondent
that the Kemps called the bank and advised them that
they held a "second mortgage" on the property and
wanted to know what they should do because they understoood that the bank was foreclosing or threatening
foreclosure of its mortgage lien (R. 153). At no time
prior thereto had the Appellants or any other party ever
given the Respondent notice of any claim or asserted
interest of the Appellants nor the fact that any additional sum remained unpaid upon the purchase price of the
properties. (R. 153).
The Respondent, to facilitate the closing of its
mortgage loan with the Nobles, obtained a Preliminary
Title Report from Security Title Company of Salt
Lake City, Utah (Ex. 16-P ) and utilized said report
in the closing of said loan to obtain Deeds of Convey·
ance and other appropriate document!) as evidence of a
clear, marketable title in the Nobles (R. 145 ) . Instruc·
tions for the preparation of the closing statements were
given by the Borrower, Dr. Noble, and all statements
of account were made pursuant to the instructions of
the Borrower and in conformance with the aforesaid
Preliminary Title Report. It was not until after the
Respondent had instituted proceedings to foreclose its
Deed of Trust that the Appellants came forward and
asserted their claim.
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ARGUMENT
There can be no argument as to the rules of law
applicable in the instant case. Neither can there be any
<loubt as to the identity of the rules which are determinative of the issues. The Purchase Money Mortgage,
considered to be a creature of equity and to be accorded
priority, must meet certain standards and requirements.
In general, a Purchase Money Mortgage has been defined as:
"A mortgage given concurrently with a conveyance of land, by the vendor to the vendee, on the
same land, to secure the unpaid balance of the
purchase price." See 6 A.L.R. 1420, Ladd &
Tilton Bank v. Mitchell, 93 Oreg. 668, 184 P.
282, 284.

To avoid confusion in dealing with real property,
the State of Utah has enacted a statute intended to put
at rest the issue of priorities of liens and interests in real
property. Title 57, Chapter 1, Section 6 of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, is the controlling statute on this
point. It is therein stated:
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every
instrument of writing setting forth an agree•
ment to convey any real estate or whereby any
real estate may be affected, to operate as notice
to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged
and certified in the manner prescribed by this
title and recorded in the office of the Recorder
of the County in which said real estate is situ-.
ated, but shall be valid and binding between the
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledg-
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merits, certification, or recording, and as to all
other persons who have had actual notice. * * •
(Emphasis added.)
It is
in 45 Am.Jr., Section 172, RECORDS
and RECORDING LAWS, that:

"The intention of the acts requiring deeds to
be recorded is to secure subsequent purchasers
and encumbrancers against prior secret convey·
ances and fradulent encumbrances; and there·
fore, when a person has notice of a prior convenance it is not a secret conveyance by which he can
be prejudiced. It is an elementary rule in the
construction of recording laws that notice of an
unrecorded instrument is equivalent to the recording of it, with respect to the person having
such notice. As a general rule, an unrecorded
deed or other instrument affecting the title to
land is valid, therefore, against a subsequent pur·
chaser taking with knowledge or notice of the
existence of the instrument; and while this ex·
ception is usually the result of construction, yet it
is sometimes expressly declared by the statute."
From the foregoing, it is evident that where a re·
cording statute has been enacted, that the same governs
in the case of parties who deal with property without
act;ual notice of any outstanding or conflicting interest.
A landmark case in point involving issues of the
instant case is that of John Jackson v. W. E. Reid, 30
Kans. 10, 1 P. 308. The identical issue as to which of
two mortgages was entitled to priority was raised in that
case. The court there stated that under the circum·
stances, where the party who had recorded the first and
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prior mortgage without actual notice of the alleged purdiase money mortgage was entitled to priority. The
court there stated:
"In such a case the burden is on the holder of
the prior unrecorded mortgage to prove the exceptions named in the section. Prima facie, it is
subordinate to the latter recorded mortgage. So
it developed upon Jackson to show that Turner
had actual notice. * * * So far as the registry
laws affect the question, a mortgage stands upon
the same platform as a deed. * * * The unrecorded instrument, whether deed or mortgage, is
void except as between the parties, and those who
have actual notice, and a party ignorant of an unrecorded instrument may purchase of one holding
recorded title or mortgage of interest without
fear of being disturbed by the claimant of such
unrecorded instrument. Mott v. Clark, 9 Pa.
State 399, Wade Notice, Section 262; Choteau v.
Jones, 11 Ill. 300; Lightner v. Mooney, 10
'Vatts, 407. * * * But the fact that a .r_nortgage
is given for purchase money, does not place it
outside the provisions of the Registry Act or give
it priority to which it would not be entitled under
said Act."
From the foregoing authority it is of interest to
note that the Utah statute on recording appears to contain the same identical language as the Kansas statute.
It is further stated in 59 C.J.S., Section 245, on
JIORTGAGES:

"In the absence of a statute or special circumstances taking the case out of the general rule,
and in the absence of special equities growing out
of questions of notice, good or bad faith, want
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of consideration, or the like, the rule of priority
as between two independent mortgages on the
same property at different times to different
mortgages, is that the one first recorded is a
superior lien to the other, whether it was execut.
ed before or after such other. * * *
Of further interest on the issue of purchase money
.Mortgages is the language contained in 59 C.J.S., Section 246 ( b), wherein it is stated:

"* * * the fact that an unrecorded mortgage
is for the purchase money of land will not necessarily give it priority over a later mortgage re·
corded before the purchase money mortgage; il
the holder o fthe purchase money mortgage voluntarily withholds it from record and meanwhile
money is lent on another mortgage which is re·
corded with due diligence, the usual rule will apply and give priority to the mortgage first recorded, and a purchase money mortgage may be
subordinated to valid intervening liens acquired
without notice that the mortgage was for purchase money for the latter, although recorded,
does not recite that it is such a mortgage. A pur·
chase money mortgage is not prior to a previous·
ly recorded mortgage of which the holder of the
purchase money mortgage had both constructive
and actual notice. There is also authority to the
effect that a purchase money mortgage is not entitled to priority over a second mortgage which is
filed first, although the second mortga&'ee has
notice of the purchase money mortgage. '
It is of interest to note that from the testimony ad·
duced in the trial of the instant case, the Kemps did in
fact have actual notice of the existence of the mortgage
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in favor of Zion's First National Bank, and if not actual
notice, they were charged with constructive notice. Unquestionably, the Kemps voluntarily withheld their
mortgage from the public record; and under the rules
announced in the foregoing authorities there can be no
doubt but what the mortgage lien of Zion's First National Bank is entitled to a priority over the mortgage
lien of the Kemps.
Another case in point is that of Farmers

Merchants State Bank of Cawker City v. Higgins, et al., 149
Kans. 783, 89 P. 2d 916. In that case the landowner
gave a deed of the subject property to his daughter and
thereafter gave the bank, for valuable consideration, a
mortgage covering the same land without the bank having actual notice of the prior deed. The mortgage was
filed of record prior to the deed, and the court there sustained the mortgage as having priority under the recording statutes of the State of Kansas, which statute
is essentially identical with the statute of the State of
Utah. The court there stated:
"The plaintiff being a purchaser for value
without notice the statute gives the mortgage of
plaintiff priority of the deed of defendant."
As further authority on the issue, I invite the
court's attention to 105 A.L.R. at page 889, where, in
discussing the issue of priorities of equitable title against
otherwise prior liens of mortgages, it is stated:
"Appellees assert an equitable title against the
otherwise prior liens of the mortgagees. They
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thus assumed the burden of showing that the
mortgagees had knowledge of their rights at the
time they took their mortgages, or that, through
appellee's possession, appellants had means of
knowledge which they ignored. * * * There is
a finding that appellants had no actual knowledge of the rights or possession of appellees.
There is no finding that the mortgagees were not
good faith holders, without notice and no facts
are found which are sufficient as a matter of law
to impute knowledge to appellants and therefore appellees did not sustain the burden which
was upon them. Under all the facts specially
found, the mortgagees must be treated as having
taken their mortgage liens in good faith and
without notice of appellee' s equities."
36 Am.Jur. at Section 209 of .MORTGAGES

states:

"It is a general rule in equity that where a
person having rights, and knowing these rights,
sees another person taking a mortgage upon
property, without disclosing his title, he shall not
be allowed afterward to set up his title to def eat
the mortgage. A fortiori, a strong case of estoppel is made out when, by conduct or representation, an owner encourages another to believe that
a third person is the owner of land and thereby
induces the other to take a mortgage on the prop·
erty. Similarly, a mortgagee may lose priority
because of circumstances which constitute a
waiver, or which estop him from asserting such
priority. This is particularly true where there
is fraud or negligence on the part of the mort·
gagee. Such estoppel may result where the P.arty
claiming the benefit of the estoppel was nusled
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by a specific statement of the party alleged to be
estopped."
Section 210:
"While there are cases in which silence alone is
held not to affect the rights of a mortgagee, as
a general rule a mortgagee who stands by and
sees another lending money on the same estate
without giving him notice of his prior mortgage
will be held to be estopped from asserting his
encumbrance as a prior lien against the party
whom he permitted to make the advance of further loan. In such cases it is declared to be inequitable to allow the mortgagee to profit by his
own wrong in concealing his claim, thereby lending encouragement to the new loan. The conclusion that the holder of a first mortgage shall be
disbarred from asserting his priority is particularly applicable where he was affected with
notice that the person who accepted the later
mortgage would not have advanced the loan except upon the terms that such loan should constitute a paramount charge upon the property in
question."
A review of the testimony and evidence in the instant case conclusively demonstrates that the Kemps
by their silence and their conduct have waived any
priority of mortgage lien which they now assert; and
furthermore, that under the rules of equity they should
not now be permitted to reap the advantages and benefits of a first mortgage lien in the light of their conduct
of standing idly by and permitting the bank to advance
its moneys upon the subject property without disclosing
to the bank that they claimed an interest paramount to
11

that of the bank, or any interest at all. The doctrines of Jc
estoppel and waiver seem abundantly available as de. N
fenses to the claims of the said Kemps.
D

A landmark case in the State of Utah involving the to
identical issue of purchase money mortgage as asserted gi
in the instant case, is that of State v. Johnson, 71 Utah
572, 268 P. 561. In that case the issue involved was a st
determination of priority of two mortgages upon the
same tract of land. The court there discussing the matter
of purchase money mortgages states:
"A mortgage for purchase money, to be en.
titled to preference, must be executed simultane·
ously with the deed of conveyance from the ven·
dor. If an interval of time is left between the
two transactions, then preference is lost." There
citing l Jones on MORTGAGES, Section 583.
(Emphasis added) .
The court further noted that in that case, where the
moneys from the first mortgage had been utilized to pay
the vendor, that such a mortgage was as much a pur·
chase money mortgage as the other, and that the equities
of the two mortgages were equal. In the light of the
facts of the instant case, where the deed of conveyance
from the Kemps to the N ables was dated, executed, and
delivered on the 19th day of November, 1964, and the
date of the obligation representing the vendor's lien was
November 30, 1964, the mortgage securing the same
dated November 20, 1964, delivered in late November,
1964, and not recorded until February 9, 1966, there
can be no doubt but that under the rule of law in the
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Johnson case aforesaid, the mortgage lien of Zion's First

e- National Bank dated November 20, 1964, and recorded
December 4, 1964 would, as a matter of law, be entitled

to and should be accorded priority over the Kemp mort,d gage.
1e

h

36 Am.Jr., Section 231 on MORTGAGES further

a states:
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"The reason most frequently advanced for the
rule giving preference to purchase money mortgage of outstanding interests acquired through
the mortgagor is that the execution of the deed
and mortageg are simultaneous acts so that no
claim or lien arising through the mortgagor can
attach before the purchase money mortageg. * * *
(Emphasis added) (See 117 Kan. 717; 232 P .
1060)

A further statement of the law relevant to the issue
e involved in the instant case is in Ogden's California Real
Property Law, page 650, Section 17.32, wherein it is
there stated:
"A mortgage given by the purchaser to secure
a portion of the purchase price of the property
covered thereby takes a special priority, i.e., it
is superior to all other liens created against the
purchaser, sub.feet to the operation of the recording laws.* * * (Tolman v. Smith, 85 Cal. 280).

In the case of Rogers v. Tucker as cited in 137
A.L.R. at page 572, the purchase money mortgage was
e accorded priority where the second mortgage to a third
e person was recorde d prior to the purchase money mort-
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gage by the second mortgagee who had knowledge of
the existence of the unrecorded mortgage.
Of simliar significance is the case of Corning v.
Murray, 3 N.Y. 652, wherein it was stated:
"Where parties had know ledge of all the circumstances, subsequently recorded purchase
money mortgage had priority as between parties,
but a transferee of the mortgage which was first
recorded having no notice of existing equities in
favor of the purchase money mortgage, had a·
right to rely upon the record."
It is interesting to note from all of the foregoing
authorities that in order for the purchase money mortgage to be entitled to priority, the deed of conveyance
and the purchase money mortgage must be executed
simultaneously. There must be actual not.ice of the exist·
ence of the purchase money lien and the purchase money
mortgage must not be withheld from the public record ·
in such manner as to mislead other parties dealing with
the subject property.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, an analysis of the evidence and testimony in this case clearly preponderates in favor of the
conclusion that the mortgage of Zion's First National
Bank is a first and prior lien, and that the mortgage
lien of the Kemps is and should be decreed to constitute
a junior and subordinate mortgage against the subject
properties.
14

if

V,

r;e
S,

st
m

a
1g

t-

:e

!d
t·

!)'

:d ,
th

i·

1e

al
5e
e

When we consider that the jury in the instant case,
sitting in an advisory capacity to the court, found from
a preponderance of the evidence that the Zion's First
National Bank did not have actual notice of the existence of the Kemp mortgage at any time prior to the
recorda tion of the Bank's lien; and the further admitted
fact that the Kemps negligently omitted to disclose
their position with reference to the subject property until February of 1966; that the said Kemps accepted the
benefits of the mortgage proceeds obtained from the
said Zion's First National Bank; and that the mortgage
in favor of the said Bank was with due diligence made a
matter of public record, and the funds advanced thereon,
there can be put one conclusion under the prevailing
rules of law as hereinabove announced; and that is, that
the mortgage lien of Zion's First National Bank is entitled to preference and priority to the mortgage lien of
the Kemps.
Respectfully submitted,
BRANT H. WALL
Attorney for DefendantRespondent,
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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